Demand Curve Effects in Experimental Auctions: The Effect of Quantity Already Owned by Colson, Gregory et al.






Department of Economics 




Wallace E. Huffman 
Distinguished Professor of Agriculture and Economics 
Department of Economics 












Selected Paper prepared for presentation at the Agricultural & Applied Economics Association 















Copyright 2009 by Gregory Colson, Wallace Huffman, and Matthew Rousu.  All rights reserved.  
Readers may make verbatim copies of this document for non-commercial purposes by any means, 
provided that this copyright notice appears on all such copies. 
  1 
 
Introduction 
Experimental auctions have become an increasingly common mechanism for eliciting 
consumers' willingness to pay (WTP).  In part, the increased prominence of experimental 
auctions derives from their theoretically demand revealing properties.  That is, unlike a 
hypothetical survey, participants have a dominant strategy to truthfully reveal their 
preferences through their bids.  Comparisons between value estimates from experimental 
auctions have shown this is indeed the case (e.g., see Fox et al. 1998 and List 2001). 
While experimental auctions are demand revealing in theory, there has been much 
attention in the literature focusing on the “proper” design of auctions.  There has been 
discussion regarding whether participants should bid on products in repeated rounds with 
posted prices (e.g., List and Shogren 1999 and Rousu and Corrigan 2006b), the effect of 
endowing participants with products (e.g., Corrigan and Rousu 2006a), and the impact of 
laboratory versus market environments (e.g., Lusk and Fox 2003). 
Across studies, one area where most experimental auction methods are consistent 
is in dealing with potential substitution or negatively sloped demand-curve effects.  These 
effects occur when participants' bids are affected through the potential of obtaining 
multiple units of a product during the auction.  Researchers usually prevent this 
possibility by having only one round of bidding (on one unit of a commodity) in the 
auction serve as the "binding" round where participants can win products (e.g., Dickinson 
and Bailey 2002 and Alfnes and Rickertsen 2003). 
While researchers are careful to control for demand curve effects within an 
auction, previous studies do not control for demand curve effects from outside the 
auction.  As previously mentioned, a demand-revealing auction theoretically elicits a 2 
 
consumers' reservation price for a product.  If bidders may at most win a single unit of 
the product, then their bids reflect their reservation price for a single unit.  But, the fact 
that bidding is on only a single unit does not yield the researcher any information as to 
whether consumers are in fact bidding on their 1st or nth (n>1) unit of the product.  This 
arises because it is possible that they currently posses the product through a previous 
purchase unrelated to the auction.  Hence, to the researcher it is unknown whether bids 
reflect reservation prices for the 1st or nth unit of the product. 
Omitting inventories presents problems in the standard design and analysis of 
experimental auction data.
1  First, if bids by otherwise equivalent individuals with and 
without inventories are the same, experimental auctions may not properly access 
willingness to pay or demand.  Namely, it would raise the question of whether consumers 
fully consider their monetary and non-monetary endowments in the somewhat “artificial” 
market environment of the experimental auction.  Conversely, if consumers with and 
without units of the product do in fact bid differently as theory dictates, this can present a 
problem for previous studies in that bids are compared from individuals at different 
points on their demand curves.  In addition, if a researcher does not know where an 
individual bidding in an auction is on his demand curve, it is not possible to distinguish 
preferences from demand curve effects.  For example, an individual who submits a small 
bid for a product could either have low preferences for the product or high preferences 
for the product, but with quantity already owned.  As illustrated in the next section, this 
                                                 
1 Please note that while this paper in particular considers the impact of quantity owned in the context of 
experimental auctions, the implications extend beyond auctions.  Other mechanisms commonly used to 
elicit preferences or valuations (e.g. stated choice experiments) will potentially be affected by the same 
issue. 3 
 
has implications for the interpretation and application of auction data, particularly when 
considering non-durable commodities that are purchased on a repeated basis. 
In this article, we examine the impact of outside inventories on bids in a random 
nth-price auction with fresh broccoli, tomatoes, and potatoes as commodities.  After 
completing the rounds of bidding, participants were asked if they currently have any of 
the auctioned products at home.  Since the auctioned vegetables have a short shelf-life, 
we propose that individuals with inventory would have lower bids conditional on 
properly controlling for other confounding factors.  Regression analysis indicates that 
there is a significant "quantity owned effect".  This result has important implications for 
the design of experimental auctions where the target is elicitation and analysis of 
willingness to pay. 
The paper is outlined as follows.  The next section provides a simple model of 
bidding when outside inventories are held.  Section 3 describes the auction procedures.  
Section 4 summarizes bids by individuals with and without quantity owned.  Section 5 
presents estimates of a fixed-effects regression model.  Finally, the paper is concluded. 
 
Model of Auction Bids  
To illustrate how product inventories can affect consumers’ bids in an experimental 
auction we present a simple model of product demand and bidding behavior.  Consider a 
representative consumer with a per unit of time monetary budget of   (e.g., a weekly 
food budget) to be allocated over a choice set of   1  goods denoted by   ,   where   
is a scalar and   is a vector of   goods.  Let market prices for the goods be denoted   
and    respectively.  At the time of the auction, the consumer may potentially hold 4 
 
inventories of some of the products in their resource set (i.e. products that have been 
purchased but not consumed/depleted during the time period).  For simplicity of 
exposition, we consider an individual who potentially holds inventories only of good   
and denote the quantity already owned as    (where     0 ).  We assume that there is no 
resale market for these inventories (or equivalently that the transaction cost for resale is 
sufficiently high).  As well, we assume that a unit of a similar good that is purchased in 
an experimental auction is a perfect substitute for a corresponding unit in inventory.  
Given the choice set of goods, market prices, product inventory, and resource constraints, 
the representative consumer solves a utility maximization problem whose dual 
representation is the following expenditure minimization problem: 
(1)      , ,     min       ,  . .         ,      ,   ,  0 . 
Immediately from the optimization specification we see that if the consumer holds 
inventories (    0 ), the expenditure minimization problem departs slightly from the 
classic textbook representation.  Here,   represents the net demand for the good (i.e. the 
quantity of additional units the consumer would purchase,    is the quantity already 
owned, and the sum       is total demand (i.e., the aggregate quantity that would be 
consumed over an appropriate time interval).  For each commodity optimization yields 
compensated demand functions,            , ,   and       , ,  , and inverse 
compensated demand functions (or “WTP curves”),   π       , ,   and   
   , ,  .  The expression π      , ,   represents the price the consumer is willing to 
pay for the        ’th unit. 
  Now, appealing to the compensating variation measure, we are able to express the 
consumer’s WTP for an additional unit of good  .  Assuming that the consumer engages 5 
 
in a fully demand revealing incentive compatible auction, they should submit a bid equal 
to the maximum amount of money such that they would be indifferent between winning 
the auction or not.  This amount is simply equal to the area under the inverse 
compensated demand function arising from the change in quantity.  Assuming that the 
consumer is bidding on a single unit of commodity z, their auction bid is 
(2)           π      , ,    
 
  . 
The bid expression shows that product inventories can have an impact on bid levels.  
Specifically, as would be expected, given that π is a non-increasing function in quantity, 
it follows that the bid level is non-increasing in inventory   .  Hence, we would expect 
bids by an individual with inventory who is otherwise identical to an individual without 
inventory to be smaller. 
    While from the preceding model it is clear that units held in inventory can 
decrease a consumer’s bid-price in an auction, from a researcher’s perspective the 
question remains: is this a concern?  The answer depends upon the target of the inquiry 
and the nature of the goods being considered.  For durable goods that are infrequently 
replaced, consumers’ bid-prices conditional on inventories represents their willingness to 
pay for an additional unit in both the near and more distant future.  This is likely the 
target value a researcher studying these types of goods is seeking, and hence, assuming 
bidders do in fact consider their inventories when bidding, should receive appropriate bid 
data.   
However, for studies involving non-durable goods that degrade and are 
characterized by repeated replenishment (e.g., food items that spoil), bids will reflect 
current conditions, not the near future where inventories are consumed and potentially 6 
 
replaced (e.g., after the refrigerator is depleted and the consumer returns to the 
supermarket).  Using bids without considering the impact of inventories prohibits 
appropriate analysis of arguably the primary target of such studies, behavior in the next 
purchase scenario when inventory is depleted.
2   
Furthermore, inventories present a problem when comparing bids across 
individuals.  Since those individuals with higher preferences for the auction commodity 
are the most likely to be purchasers of the product in the outside market, they are also 
more likely to be holding inventories at the time of the experiment.  For individuals with 
lower preferences, the converse is likely.  Hence, there is a greater likelihood that bids by 
those individuals who have high preferences are pushed downwards due to them being 
most probable to be holding inventories.  Therefore, potentially resulting in high 
preference individuals appearing to the researcher as low preference individuals.  This 
would be most problematic for products with relatively inelastic demand curves.  Again, 
while this may not be a problem for durable goods, when considering products such as 
perishable food items this could lead to bid and welfare analysis that does not 
appropriately characterize “next period” demand. 
 
Auction Design 
  The bidding data used in this study is part of a larger project to assess consumers’ 
willingness to pay for genetically modified (GM) and GM Free foods.  Participants in the 
study were solicited from the general public by the Iowa State University Center for 
Survey Statistics and Methods.  Potential participants were invited to participate in a 
                                                 
2 It could be argued that the potential impact of inventories on bids is more significant in laboratory 
experiments compared to field experiments given the likelihood of consumers holding smaller or no 
inventories when arriving to shop at the field experiment location. 7 
 
university study for $45 in compensation, but were not told beforehand the nature of the 
project.  Willing participants were given their choice between four different session 
starting times and provided with directions to the site of the experiments.  The steps of 
each experimental session are as follows. 
  After participants completed a brief questionnaire and consent forms, the session 
leader provided instructions and examples about the random nth-price auction (Shogren 
et al. 1994) which was used in the study.  Participants were further trained on the 
mechanism by engaging in a two-round practice auction.  After the training period, 
participants were randomly assigned one of five different information treatments 
containing perspectives on genetic modification.  The information treatments included 
combinations of pro-biotech, anti-biotech, and third-party perspectives on genetic 
modification.  A no information treatment was also included as a control.   
  After participants finished reading their respective information treatments, the 
session monitor led the participants through a multi-round random nth-price auction.   
Bids were collected by the session monitor after each round and not posted until all 
bidding rounds were completed and the single binding round was announced.  In each 
round three separate products were placed up for sale: broccoli (1 lb.), beefsteak tomatoes 
(1 lb.), and russet potatoes (5 lb.).  For the purposes of this study, we are utilizing bidding 
data on GM Free labeled products and Plain labeled products (“Plain label” denotes a 
product that bore a label only detailing the product name and weight with no descriptor of 
genetic modification). 
  After completion of the bidding rounds participants were asked to complete an 
exit questionnaire.  Among the included questions, three key responses are utilized in this 8 
 
study.  For each commodity (broccoli, tomatoes, and potatoes) participants were asked if 
they (1) currently have any of the vegetable at home, (2) regularly purchase the 
vegetable, and (3) regularly eat the vegetable.  After finishing the exit questionnaire, 
winners of the auction proceeded to a separate room to purchase their products and non-
winners were free to leave. 
 
Bid Summary 
In this section, a summary of the auction participants' bids is provided.  Table 1 shows 
the proportion of individuals who indicated that they (1) had the product at home at the 
time of the auction, (2) regularly eat the food product, and (3) regularly purchase the food 
product.
3  More than half of the sample regularly eats and purchases each of the three 
commodities.  As well, slightly more than half of the sample at the time of the auction 
had fresh broccoli and tomatoes at home, and nearly 90% of the auction participants had 
fresh potatoes in inventory.   
 
Table 1. Summary Statistics for Current Inventory and Habit Variables 
 
Variable Variable  Definition  Broccoli  Tomato  Potato 
Purchase  1 if regularly purchase product  0.60  0.58  0.77 
Eat  1 if regularly eat product  0.61  0.65  0.81 
Have  1 if currently have product at home  0.60  0.58  0.89 
 
Table 2 summarizes average bids for Plain label and GM Free food products, 
broken-down by responses to whether bidders have the product currently at home, eat and 
purchase regularly.  A null hypothesis of no significant difference in bid prices across 
responses was tested (an unpaired t-test).  Individuals who currently have the commodity 
                                                 
3 As would be expected, the correlation between regularly eat and regularly purchase is nearly one. 9 
 
at home have a lower average bid price for some, but not all of the Plain label and GM 
Free commodities.  For none of the food products is the mean difference in bids by those 
with and without inventory statistically different.  This result, when viewed in isolation, 
fails to confirm the expectation that individuals with quantity owned would bid less than 
individuals without quantity owned. 
 
Table 2. Mean Bids for Food Products 
 
   Have    Eat    Purchase 
Product Label Yes No  Diff   Yes No  Diff   Yes No  Diff 
Broccoli Plain   1.21 1.28  -0.07  1.42 0.95 0.47**   1.43 0.95 0.48** 
Tomato Plain 1.42 1.12  0.30   1.67 0.59 1.08**   1.72 0.71 1.01** 
Potato Plain  2.05 1.94  0.11   2.04 1.98 0.07   2.07 1.91 0.16 
                   
Broccoli GMF 1.41 1.49  -0.07  1.57 1.24 0.33   1.59 1.23 0.36* 
Tomato GMF  1.52 1.29  0.23   1.77 0.78 0.99**   1.82 0.88 0.93** 
Potato GMF  2.17 2.50  -0.33  2.14 2.50 -0.36   2.17 2.34 -0.17 
Note: * and ** denote significance at the 10% and 5% levels respectively. 
 
When comparing average bids by individuals who eat or purchase the 
commodities with those who do not, the difference in bids is greater and statistically 
significant at the 10% significance level for Plain label and GM Free broccoli and 
tomatoes.  This result is in line with expectations in that regularity of consumption and 
purchase are proxies for individual preferences for the commodities.   
While the unconditional analysis of bids presented in table 2 does not provide 
substantial evidence as to whether inventories affect bid prices, this is not an unexpected 
result given that other individual-specific factors affecting WTP are not controlled for.  
Regression analysis presented in the following section yields more conclusive evidence 
on the impact of inventories. 10 
 
 
Econometric Model and Estimates 
In order to isolate whether quantity owned impacts bid-prices and to control for other 
potential confounding factors, a linear fixed-effects model is estimated.  The dependent 
variable is consumers’ bid-prices stacked over the three commodities (broccoli, tomato, 
and potato) and the two labeling treatments (Plain label and GM Free).  Fixed effects are 
included for each of the auctioned commodities.  The two key independent variables for 
this study are dummies for have and purchase which respectively denote if the participant 
responded that he/she currently have the vegetable in inventory at home and if he/she 
regularly purchases the vegetable.
4  Additional explanatory variables were included to 
control for other demographic and preference attributes that may affect bid-prices 
include: dummy variables for each information treatment (no information treatment 
dummy omitted), income (in thousands), gender (1 if female), informed (1 if participant 
responded as being well or extremely well informed about GM), opinion ( 1  i f  t h e  
participant responded as having a supportive opinion of GM), education (years of 
schooling), environmental member (1 if member of an environmental group), and 
healthiness of diet (self assessed healthiness of diet on a 10 point scale).  Regression 
estimates are presented in table 3. 
  The coefficient estimate associated with have is negative (-0.238) and statistically 
significant at the five percent level (p=0.030).  This result shows, controlling for other 
confounding factors, that participants with product inventories acquired outside of the 
auction do submit lower bids than those individuals who do not have outside inventories.  
                                                 
4 Due to the high multicollinearity between responses to regularity of “purchase” and “eat”, only a dummy 
variable for purchase is included. 11 
 
This result supports the hypothesis that consumers in an experimental auction, even 
conducted in a laboratory style setting, do submit bids reflecting their global willingness 
to pay - conditional on both their monetary and non-monetary endowment - as standard 
theory suggests.  In addition, this result gives further credence that despite the partially 
“artificial” nature of experiments, consumers evaluate their willingness to pay 
considering outside factors just as occurs when making decisions in a conventional 
market. 
 
Table 3. Fixed Effects Regression Results (N=342) 
 
Variable  Parameter Estimate  Standard Error 
Have -0.238*  0.109 
Purchase 0.384**  0.115 
Info Treatment 1  0.127  0.147 
Info Treatment 2  -0.197  0.165 
Info Treatment 3  0.456**  0.151 
Info Treatment 4  -0.374*  0.176 
Income 0.004**  0.001 
Informed 0.285  0.223 
Opinion 0.222  0.147 
Gender -0.072  0.131 
Education -0.059* 0.025 
Envi Member  -0.600*  0.285 
Healthiness of Diet  0.034  0.029 
Constant 1.962**  0.432 
Note:  * and ** denote significance at the 5% and 1% levels respectively. 
 
  The coefficient for purchase is positive (0.384) and significant at the one percent 
level indicating that individuals who regularly purchase the commodity in the outside 
market are willing to pay more in the auction than those who do not regularly purchase 
the commodity.  This falls in line with expectations in that we would expect individuals 
who are regular purchasers in the outside market (i.e. individuals with a WTP greater 12 
 
than the market price) to bid more than non-regular purchasers (i.e. individuals with a 
WTP less than the market price).   
  Several additional variables, which we do not focus on here, were found to be 
significant in explaining bid-prices including income, education, environmental member, 
and two of the information treatments. 
 
Conclusion 
While most studies utilizing experimental auctions take care to avoid possible bid biases 
arising from substitution and negatively sloped demand-curve effects within an auction, 
this is the first study to the knowledge of the authors to consider the impact of demand-
curve effects arising from inventories acquired outside the auction.  The implications of 
this study are a bit double-edged.  On the positive side, the estimates of the impact of 
quantity owned on bidding behavior agree with basic economic demand theory and 
indicate that participants in auctions do in fact consider their non-monetary endowment 
when placing bids.  If this were not the case, it would raise the question of whether 
experimental auctions truly capture consumers' market decisions.   
   Given these demand-curve effects of inventories, problems arise in interpreting 
bids submitted in other experimental auctions.  If information on whether individuals 
have quantity owned is not solicited from auction participants, then it is not possible to 
distinguish where individuals are on their demand curve.  Hence, it is not possible to 
distinguish whether a low bid is because an individual in fact has a low WTP for the 
product, or simply because they are further along their demand curve due to quantity 
already owned.  Whether experimental auction bids are used for assessing market 13 
 
demand, policy impacts, or welfare effects, this uncertainty about what bids actually 
reflect presents a problem and could lead to biased or simply incorrect estimates and 
conclusions.   
The results of this study raise a number of potential avenues for further research.  
A common dilemma in experimental auctions is the prevalence of bids of zero.  The 
author is left asking whether for many experimental auctions that consider valuations for 
products with steep or binary demand curves if a portion of the zero bids could be 
explained by quantity already owned.  A second issue, not considered explicitly in this 
study, is what is the impact of substitute or complement goods that are already in a 
household’s inventory?  This is an interesting question not only because of the potential 
impact on bidding behavior, but also because it raises the possibility that researchers 
might need to assess a wide array of demand curve effects for each auctioned commodity.  
Finally, one shortcoming of this paper is that we did not ask consumers to report the 
exact quantity of fresh vegetables held in inventory coming into our experimental 
auction.  While this was done by design over concerns regarding the vagaries of 
vegetable sizes and weights, future research might elicit this information and permit an in 
depth analysis of inventories on WTP curves. 
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